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1.  Introduction
           For markets to function there must be some means of assuring promises will be kept. As
Arrow (1974, p.357) notes, “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element
of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can plausibly be argued that
much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by a lack of mutual
confidence.”  Trust rests on a mix of formal and informal institutions. Contracts are maintained
both by invoking the law and via people’s concern for their reputations (Macaulay, 1963).
An experiment in the interaction between the courts and relational contracting is offered
by the transition of the formerly planned economies of eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. Seeking to avoid the “economic backwardness” noted by Arrow, the governments in these
countries have been gradually building market-oriented legal systems to replace the bureaucratic
controls of the old planned economy. At the same time, firms have been entering and developing
new relationships among themselves, replacing the networks that existed in the planned economy
but have broken down during reform (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997).
We surveyed managers of privately-owned manufacturing firms in Russia, Ukraine,
Poland, Slovakia, and Romania in 1997. These five countries give us variation in the data, with
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Poland having relatively advanced market and regulatory institutions, Russia and Ukraine lagging
behind, and Slovakia and Romania in between (EBRD, 1997).
We operationalize the abstract notion of trust in two ways. First, we measure a firm’s trust
in a customer by asking about trade credit. Financial markets being underdeveloped in these
countries, firms depend heavily on trade credit; the firms in our sample receive more of their
financing in trade credit than in bank loans.
1 To offer trade credit is to trust it will be repaid.
Second, we infer a firm’s trust in a supplier by asking whether it would abandon that supplier if
offered a 10% lower price by a new, previously unknown firm. A refusal indicates the respondent
values the security that comes from the established supplier.
Relational contracting is the basis of most of the transactions in our data. Managers say
disputes with trading partners are usually settled without third-party assistance. But the law also
matters, despite these countries’ incomplete laws and inadequate courts and collection
mechanisms (Hay and Shleifer, 1998; Hendley et al., 1997). The courts had been used by 39% of
the surveyed firms involved in a recent dispute with a trading partner. To the question of whether
the courts could be used to enforce contracts, even if the firm had never had a dispute, more than
two-thirds answered that they could.
2
 We find that relational contracting supports trade credit when (a) the supplier has
obtained information about the customer from other firms in the industry or through a social
network; (b) the two firms have traded over a long enough period that trust has had time to
develop; and (c) the customer is locked into the relationship by having high costs of search for an
alternative supplier.
                                                       
1 Trade credit amounts to 54% of external finance for the Polish firms in our sample, 57% for the Slovakian firms,
and 45% for Ukrainian firms. Only in Russia is trade credit uncommon, representing 2% of external finance. (Our
data do not allow us to compute this number for Romania.)  In the West, also, a typical small- or medium-sized
firm has more trade credit than bank loans, though in the West firms have more access to equity finance (Mayer
and Alexander, 1990).
2 The situation could be worse. When Vietnamese private firms were asked the same question in 1995-96, a mere
9% answered in the affirmative (McMillan and Woodruff, 1998b).3
The courts, as well, have a perceptible effect.  Firms that say the courts can be used to
enforce contracts grant their customers significantly more trade credit than firms that say the
courts are ineffective. Nevertheless, contracting is based at least as much on relationships as on
the courts (at these countries’ 1997 level of institutional development). We find that a firm that
says the courts are effective gives 6% more trade credit on average. By comparison, dealing with
the customer for three years accounts for a 13% increase in trade credit over a new customer;
having obtained information about the customer from other manufacturers accounts for a 10%
increase; and the customer’s being managed by a family member or friend accounts for an 10%
increase.
 We find some evidence that relational contracting works as a substitute for the courts.
Courts appear to be most important at the start of a trading relationship; experience with a trading
partner diminishes their effect.
 Besides aiding contracting, interfirm relationships can bring inefficiencies. When our firms
were asked whether they would abandon a current supplier to purchase instead from a new,
previously unknown supplier offering a 10% lower price, many said they would reject the lower-
priced offer. Persisting with a high-priced supplier, because of the trust that has developed, can
generate inefficiencies as new entrants have difficulty in competing. The introduction of laws
reduces these inefficiencies. Controlling for the complexity of relationships, we find that firms that
say they can rely on the courts are more likely to abandon their existing supplier for a new, lower-
priced one.
In Section 2 we present our hypotheses on the courts and relational contracting. Section 3
contains regressions estimating the effect of the courts and relational contracting on the amount of
trade credit granted. Section 4 contains regressions estimating the effect of the courts and
relational contracting on a firm’s willingness to change trading partners. Section 5 concludes.4
2.  Contract-Enforcement Mechanisms
We surveyed privately-owned manufacturing firms with between seven and 270 workers
in Poland (303 firms), Slovakia (308), Romania (321), Russia (269) and Ukraine (270).  Most of
the surveyed firms are small, with 84% having fewer than 100 employees. Some were spun off
from state-owned enterprises, others were started from scratch.
3  We adapted the survey
methodology developed for Vietnam by McMillan and Woodruff (1998a, 1998b), though that
previous work did not focus on the relative importance of the various contract-enforcement
mechanisms. The survey
4 asked about the manufacturer's relationship with its oldest continuous
customer and its newest customer, and its oldest continuous and newest supplier. We examine
how cooperation in each of the four trading relationships is affected by the availability of the
courts and relational contracting.
Underlying the hypotheses we test is the notion that firms’ characteristics, and the actions
they take, are difficult for other firms to observe (Wilson, 1985). A customer might or might not
be dependable in paying its bills. A supplier might or might not be competent to produce goods of
an acceptable quality and on time, and even if competent might or might not have incentives to do
so. A firm can learn about its potential customers’ and suppliers’ reliability by making inquiries via
a trade association, a social network, or other firms in the same line of business. It also learns
about its trading partners through its experience in dealing with them. A firm can give a trading
partner an incentive not to renege on a deal either by a legally enforceable contract (provided the
                                                       
3  In our sample for Poland, Romania, and Slovakia startups far outnumber privatized firms, whereas in Russia and
Ukraine privatized firms dominate. For an explanation of why private sector development started earlier in Poland,
but is similar in nature to what has occurred elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, see
Johnson and Loveman (1995).
4 The survey was designed to find similar firms in similar cities in all five countries. The survey questions used in
this paper (a subset of the questions asked) are listed and discussed in Appendix A, along with some descriptive
data; more are in Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (1998). We exclude from the data relationships with state-
owned enterprises and firms located outside the country, as these relationships involve different contract-
enforcement issues from relationships with domestic private firms (state-owned firms are not necessarily profit-
maximizers and might have priviliged connections with the bureaucracy; foreign firms might be operating under
special legal provisions). We also exclude relationships begun in the pre-reform era, prior to 1989.29% of the
customer relationships and 39% of the supplier relationships in the sample are with state-owned enterprises, and
another 7% and 11% are export customers and import suppliers respectively.   A much smaller percentage (2%) of
the relationships began before 1989. The results are not significantly affected by the exclusion of these results; see
footnote 23.5
legal institutions exist and the actions in question are verifiable) or by the prospect that acceptable
performance will be rewarded with profitable future business.
2.1  The courts
All five countries have functioning legal systems. In Russia, for example, contract disputes
between “juridical persons” (i.e., firms and organizations) are heard by commercial courts
(arbitrazhnye sudy in Russian), while “physical persons” use the ordinary courts.
5 Background for
our study is provided by some indexes of these countries’ legal environments for business. The
EBRD’s (1997) index of how commercial laws are being enforced and administered, based on a
survey of lawyers in the region, shows differences among the countries: Poland scored 4+,
Slovakia, Romania and Russia scored 3, and Ukraine scored 2.6  The Wall Street Journal’s panel
of investment professionals rates the countries as of the end of 1997 according to an index of the
rule of law. Poland scored 9.0 on a scale of one to ten, Romania scored 6.4, Slovakia 6.2, Russia
5.4, and Ukraine 3.9 (Wall Street Journal, 1998). The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic
Freedom for 1997, also the result of evaluation by outside experts (Johnson, Holmes and
Kirkpatrick 1998), in terms of property rights put Poland ahead with a score of 2, Slovakia and
Russia scored 3, Romania and Ukraine scored 4.7  The picture from these measures of the legal
environment is therefore fairly consistent.  Poland is usually the best, followed by Slovakia.
Ukraine consistently scores the lowest.  Russia and Romania occupy intermediate positions.
In contrast to these aggregative indexes of legal development, our survey gives a firm-
level view. Measuring the impact of courts on contracting is difficult. With an efficient court
                                                       
5 For a description of how the court system functioned in the Soviet Union and how it has changed since then, see
Gustafson (1999, Ch.7).
6 The EBRD’s explanations for these scores are rather long and should be consulted by the reader (EBRD 1997,
p.19).  In summary: 4+ denotes clear commercial laws that are supported by an effective court system; 3 indicates
that the commercial laws are clear but not fully supported by the court system; and 2 denotes “commercial legal
rules are generally unclear and sometimes contradictory.”
7 This index measures the protection of private property by the government and judicial system.  A 2 denotes “very
high” protection, a 3 denotes “high” protection, a 4 denotes low protection, and a 5 denotes very low protection
(Johnson, Holmes and Kirkpatrick 1998, pp.47).6
system, we should observe few disputes. For this reason we asked managers not only whether
they had actually used the courts to enforce a contract but also whether they could use the courts
if a dispute arose, even if their firm had never had a dispute with a trading partner.
8
Table 1 summarizes our indicators of the effectiveness of courts. To the question of
whether the courts could hypothetically be used to enforce contracts with customers and
suppliers, more than two-thirds of managers across the five countries say they can be. The
percentage is highest in Romania (87%) and Poland (73%) and lowest in Ukraine (55%).
9  Most
firms, in fact, have been involved in a contractual dispute (58%). We asked these managers
whether they used the court in their most recent dispute with a customer or supplier. Among
those firms reporting at least one dispute, more than half in Russia and Ukraine and almost half in
Poland said they used the courts. Courts were used in less than a third of disputes in Slovakia and
Romania.
10  Romanian firms are most likely to say they can use the courts but least likely to have
used them. Polish firms, on the other hand, are less likely to say courts can be used but more
likely to have used them.
Workable courts offer some assurance that debts will be paid.  Our first hypothesis,
therefore, is that firms that express faith in the courts will offer more trade credit.  In the
                                                       
8 The propensity to use the courts to settle disputes varies across countries even when legal systems are well
developed. Macaulay (1963) gives examples of US firms being reluctant to go to court in a dispute. Japanese firms
are still more reluctant than US firms; Haley (1978) argues that the costs of using the Japanese courts are so high
that suing usually does not pay. Arrighetti, Bachman and Deakin (1997, p.188) asked some European firms
about the likelihood of legal action against a customer or supplier committing a breach of contract: of about 20
firms in each country, 40% of British firms, 79% of Italian firms, and 95% of German firms said it was unlikely or
very unlikely.
9 Pop-Eleches (1998) finds that 67% of small retailers in Romania say they can use the courts for disputes with
business partners, while Frye and Shleifer (1997) report that only 45% of a sample of retailers in Poland responded
similarly. These levels are consistent with our findings, given the larger size of the manufacturing firms in our
survey. But we find less optimism among Russian managers than Frye and Shleifer, who report that 65% of their
sample of Russian retailers say they can use courts for disputes with business partners.
10Although Russian and Ukrainian firms are most likely to use courts given a dispute, they are least likely to report
having had a dispute, so the percentage of firms having experience with courts is actually lowest in those countries.
The percentage of firms reporting disputes is only 16% in Russia and 20% in Ukraine, compared to more than 75%
of in each of the other three countries. While this may reflect a difference in the interpretation of the question
across countries, it may also reflect more personalistic relationships with customers and suppliers given the much
smaller number of customers the Russian and Ukrainian firms have.7
regressions to follow we test this, taking as our main measure of courts’ effectiveness the answer
to the question of could you use the courts if you had a dispute. Despite the hypothetical nature of
this question, it appears to be a better measure than experience with courts, because courts might
be used less frequently the more effective they are. We will, however, use the question about
actual court use as a check on the regression results.
Why would firms within a given country vary in their assessments of the courts’
effectiveness?  They operate, after all, under the same laws. Within-country differences could arise
in three ways. (a) The accessibility of the courts could be objectively different for different firms
or for different managers. For example, there could be fixed costs either of using the courts or of
investigating whether they are usable; larger firms would then be more likely to say the courts are
usable. Or managers who are better educated or younger might adapt more quickly to the rapidly
changing institutions in transition economies.
11  (b) The perceived ability to use courts may be
associated with unmeasured characteristics of the managers interviewed.  Managers with “a
trusting nature” may be more likely to say courts can be used. (c) Managers could differ in
random ways in their perceptions of the courts’ effectiveness; given the speed of change of these
countries’ institutions, some errors of perception are to be expected. Differences in responses
arising from (a) and (c) imply real or perceived differences in the ability to use courts. To the
extent that the within-country differences are explained by (a) and (c), our regression coefficients
will not be misestimated, provided the managers act on their reported beliefs in their credit-
granting decisions. A positive association between the stated ability to use the courts and higher
levels of credit granted to customers can then be interpreted as an effect of the institutions on
trust.  Differences in responses arising from (b), on the other hand, are more problematic, for a
response that courts can be used may indicate an attitude of the manager (gullibility?) that is also
correlated with giving credit. We control for these factors to the extent we can by including
                                                       
11 In Poland, for example, confidence in courts is higher among firms whose managers are younger than 40 years
of age (82% versus 69%, t=2.17) and have 16 or more years of schooling (76% versus 67%, t=1.68). Firms with
more than 50 employees are only marginally more likely to say they could use courts (75% versus 72%, t=0.61).
The effect of size is more significant in Slovakia, where 73% of large firms and 64% of small firms say courts can
be used (t=1.69).8
variables measuring firm and manager characteristics.  Nevertheless, we are unable to control for
unmeasured characteristics such as a manager’s trusting nature.
2.2  Relational contracting
As Macaulay's classic 1963 study showed, courts are seldom used to resolve disputes
between trading partners even in the United States, and using them generally signals the
termination of the trading relationship.
12  Firms generally rely on relational contracting.  The
theory of repeated games provides predictions of when relational contracting works. Cooperation
rests on the ability of the firm to punish its trading partner if it does not cooperate. We test four
sets of predictions about when contracting can be supported by informal punishments.
13
First, the most straightforward punishment, refusing to deal with the trading partner in the
future, is effective if the future profits from forgone trade are large enough to outweigh the
current gains from not cooperating; this depends on the size of the discount rate or the frequency
of the interaction. A hypothesis to be tested in the regressions to follow is that more trade credit is
granted to customers that buy more frequently.
14
Second, the threat of severing a relationship gains force if it is costly to find alternative
trading partners (Kranton, 1996; Ramey and Watson, 1996). Firms work to sustain relationships
to avoid searching for new trading partners.  The second hypothesis to be tested, therefore, is that
customers with higher search costs receive more trade credit. We proxy the customer’s cost of
finding a new supplier, alternative to the interviewed firm, by the number of manufacturers of
products similar to the interviewed firm located near it (within 1 km). We expect to find that a
                                                       
12In our data, too, we find that the use of courts generally signals the severing of a relationship with a trading
partner. In Poland, for example, the relationship was severed in 98% of the cases where courts were used to resolve
a dispute, compared to 78% of the cases where they were not used in a dispute.
13 Similar questions about informal contracting in Vietnam are studied in McMillan and Woodruff (1998a).
14  This hypothesis must be treated with care, however, for the timing of purchases might not be exogenous but
rather determined at the same time as the extent of trade credit.9
larger number of similar firms located nearby is associated with firms providing less credit to their
customers.
Third, information is important in assessing credit risk. The business ability and
competitive position of the customer, its reliability, and the level of its investments affect the
likelihood of repayment. Managers were asked how they first made contact with their oldest and
newest customers.  We identify relationships as arising from two different types of information
networks, which we refer to as social networks and business networks.  Either of these networks
may provide information about trading partners; either may also provide the ability to sanction
trading partners by sullying their reputation within the network. If a firm initially learns about its
customer from other firms in the industry or through family connections, it might be more willing
to offer trade credit. The networks differ, however, in their ability to expand. Social connections
are built slowly over time, and hence social networks are relatively closed.  Business networks are
more open in the sense that they can incorporate new members more rapidly.  The regressions will
test the hypothesis that more trade credit is offered when, before the relationship began, the firm
received information about the customer from other firms or through social networks.  But we
will also look for differences in the effects of the different kinds of network.
Fourth, the history of the trading relationship might affect the level of trust.  Cooperation
might build up gradually, as the supplier learns through trading about the customer’s reliability.
By gradually increasing the amount of trade credit it offers, the firm might be able to sort fly-by-
night firms from those with longer time horizons (Ghosh and Ray, 1996; Watson, 1995).  The
regressions will test the hypothesis that more trade credit is offered when the relationship is of
longer duration.
15
Information learned from experience trading with a specific customer may substitute for
information gained from business or social networks at the start of the relationship. The ability to
use courts may also be more important at the start of a relationship, when the customer is less
                                                       
15  Banerjee and Duflo (1998) find that a firm’s reputation determines the nature of its contracting with its trading
partners, but in their analysis the reputation adheres to the firm in general (it is proxied by the age of the firm)
whereas in our analysis reputation is developed within a specific relationship.10
well known. We will test for time-dependent effects of networks and courts by interacting the
measures of relationship duration with other informal and formal enforcement variables.
For the network variables, these interaction terms will also allow us to distinguish between
two roles of networks discussed in the literature: providing information about customers’
reliability and providing an ability to sanction customers that renege. The threat of severing a
relationship if debts are not paid gains extra force if it comes not just from the firm owed the
money but also from other firms in the same line of business. Gossip among the firms permits
sharing information on customers’ behavior in order to implement such community sanctions
[Kandori 1992]. Since manufacturers also learn about the reliability of customers through dealing
with them, the initial informational advantage of networks should dissipate over time. If
community sanctions are important in eliciting cooperation, on the other hand, the effect of
networks will be enduring.
2.3   Loyalty
To the question, "If another firm you have never purchased from offered to supply this
input for a price 10% less than this supplier, would you purchase from the new firm instead of this
supplier?", firms gave one of three answers: they would refuse this offer, accept the offer and
abandon the existing supplier, or buy from the new supplier while continuing to purchase from the
old supplier. Their answers, summarized in Table 2, suggest there is significant friction in these
markets. Just over half said they would pass up the apparently better deal, in whole or in part, to
maintain the relationship with the existing supplier (for brevity we will call this “loyalty”).
Romanian firms were most likely to say they would drop their existing supplier in favor of the
cheaper supplier, giving this response in almost two-thirds of the cases. Less fragile relationships
are indicated in Poland and Slovakia, where half or fewer of the firms would abandon existing11
suppliers. In Russia and Ukraine, almost all firms say they would buy from the new supplier
without breaking the relationship the existing supplier.
16
A firm might refuse to drop its current supplier for two reasons. First, there are risks in
dealing with an unknown supplier, compared with the relative security of the customary supplier.
The risk of shifting is that the new supplier might be unreliable, supplying low-quality goods,
perhaps, or not having the goods available for delivery as needed. Second, asset specificities might
dictate staying with the current supplier. In these transition economies, however, the majority of
the trading relationships involve the exchange of general rather than relationship-specific goods.
Only 21% of the goods produced for customers identified in the survey are produced uniquely for
those customers; only 11% of suppliers produce a good sold only to the interviewed
manufacturer. And these percentages probably overstate the level of buyer-specific production,
since they may merely reflect the thinness of the markets. In the regressions to follow we control
for asset specificity by including the variable representing the supplier’s producing uniquely for
the respondent firm. The residual propensity to stick to the current supplier in the face a 10%
price cut presumably reflects the perceived risks of dealing with the unknown supplier.
A firm refuses the offered lower price, presumably, after doing a cost-benefit calculation.
A firm would willingly pay a premium to its current supplier for either or both of two reasons.
First, it knows more about the current supplier’s competence than about the potential new
supplier’s, and its risk aversion dictates paying a premium for the lower uncertainty. Second (as in
the model of Klein and Leffler (1981)) it pays a premium to get an assurance that the supplier will
not cheat it, and the supplier refrains from cheating it in order to continue earning the premium.
The question of whether a firm would abandon its established supplier for a 10% lower price
gives us a lower bound on the sum of the risk premium and the Klein-Leffler premium.
                                                       
16The responses to this hypothetical question are consistent with the data on the duration of actual customer and
supplier relationships identified in the survey. When the sample is limited to firms begun in 1987 or later (more
than 90% of the firms in every country except Poland), the average duration of relationships as a ratio of the age of
the firm is lowest in Romania, highest in Russia and Ukraine, and between the two in Poland and Slovakia.12
By increasing the scope of contracts, functioning courts reduce the risk of working with
unknown suppliers and so increase the willingness to switch. We hypothesize that firms that can
rely on courts are more willing to buy from suppliers previously unknown to them; courts should
reduce loyalty. This willingness to change suppliers, in turn, means that more productive firms are
able to gain market share more quickly, which could have profound effects on the incentives of
supplier firms to increase their productivity.
We shall run regressions with loyalty--the propensity to stick with the existing supplier--as
the dependent variable, and the same set of institutional and relationship variables as used in the
trade-credit regressions as the independent variables. Whether or not the firm switches depends
both on how much it stands to lose by abandoning the current supplier and on the risks of dealing
with the new supplier. What is lost by abandoning the current supplier depends on how well the
repeated game with the current supplier is working. If the firm does not trust the current supplier,
it has no reason to refuse the new offer. The variables we identified above with respect to trade
credit as facilitating relational contracting (other's search cost, frequency of interaction, business
and social networks, duration) are therefore also predicted to affect loyalty. For example, if
delivery is infrequent, the firm probably does not have a cooperative relationship with its current
supplier, so is more willing to switch than if the frequency is high. We further hypothesize that a
firm will be more committed to an existing relationship when its own cost of searching for
alternative sources of inputs is higher. Suppliers who are the sole source of a given input and
those providing goods sold only to the interviewed firm are harder to replace, and we expect them
to be abandoned less frequently.
Relational contracting, then, has ambiguous effects. Ongoing relationships can improve
efficiency by supporting deals that the legal system is unable to enforce. But exclusion is the
corollary of ongoing relationships. Continuing to deal with a particular supplier means being
reluctant to deal with new suppliers. If firms routinely reject lower-priced deals, low-cost
producers will find it difficult to get new customers and high-cost producers will not be driven
out. In a primitive economy, customers are stuck with their suppliers because of quality13
uncertainty; in a sophisticated economy, trading partners might be locked in by specific assets. By
controlling for factors related to the specificity and success of the relationship with the existing
supplier, we are able to say something about how functioning courts affect the efficiency of the
market.
2.4   Other contract-enforcement mechanisms
Trade associations in the West sometimes provide arbitration services for disputes
involving their members (Bernstein, 1996; Woodruff, 1998). Almost half of the firms we surveyed
are members of a trade association.  Membership is highest in Russia and Ukraine, and lowest in
Poland (see Table 1).  Two-thirds of these firms (39% of all firms) say their association offers
assistance in locating new trading partners and information on the reliability of existing or
potential trading partners (thus helping relationships to develop), and/or arbitration of disputes
with trading partners (thus substituting for the courts).
17  We hypothesize that, because trade
associations provide information about potential trading partners’ reliability and help arbitrate
disputes, membership in a trade association (a) increases the amount of trade credit a firm offers
and (b) makes a firm more ready to switch to a new supplier.
Private protection rackets are famously rife in Russia and Ukraine, though they are less
active in the other postcommunist countries.  In a survey of Russian shopkeepers by Zhuravskaya
and Frye (1998), 33% reported that one of the roles of private protection organizations was to
enforce agreements (though far more reported their role was to “protect” the shopkeepers from
other criminals).  According to anecdotes, though, the mafia play a larger role with shops than
with manufacturing firms of the sort we surveyed.  We did not focus on the mafia in our survey
(for fear that asking such a sensitive question would make managers reluctant to answer our other
                                                       
17 The Russian Chamber of Commerce, according to Greif and Kandel (1995), provides its members with
information on companies that have been alleged to have violated contracts. Some of the trade associations may
have evolved from institutions of the old planned economy. But startup firms are as likely as privatized firms to be
members of trade associations everywhere except in Slovakia, which suggests the services the associations offer are
valuable.14
questions).  We do have some suggestive information.  First, to the question about third parties
able to enforce contracts with trading partners, some firms (12% over the whole sample, but 17%
in Russia and 18% in Ukraine) said that "other organizations"--i.e., other than the courts, local or
national government agencies, or nongovernmental agencies such as trade associations--could
enforce contracts. Since they were not asked to specify the organization, we do not know what
organizations they are referring to, but presumably private protection organizations, if present, are
included. Second, firms reporting disputes with trading partners were asked whether “an informal
private agency specializing in such cases” aided in the resolution of the dispute. Only 5% of firms
gave this response, though 48% of Russian firms and 26% of Ukrainian firms reporting disputes
said they used such an agency.
18  We will insert the “other organizations” and “informal private
agency” variables in our regressions to check that they do not change the estimated effects of the
court and relationship variables that are the focus of this paper.
2.5    The effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms
The hypotheses to be tested are summarized on Table 3.  The first set of regressions, in
Section 3, examine how the courts and relational contracting affect the level of cooperation
between trading partners, as measured by trade credit. The second set, in Section 4, examine how
they affect the market friction of firms’ reluctance to buy from new suppliers.
3.  Determinants of Trade Credit
In this section we report on regressions with the percentage of the bill paid after delivery
as the dependent variable and contract-enforcement-mechanism proxies as the independent
variables.  The survey was administered to 1471 firms, yielding 2942 potential manufacturer-
customer relationships.  After excluding state-owned customers, foreign customers, and those
                                                       
18 Hendley et al. (1997) suggest that private enforcement and court enforcement may complement each other:
"Private enforcers often review relevant legal documentation before acting." The model of Baker, Gibbons, and
Murphy (1994) gives another rationale for the courts and relational contracts to be complementary: it is possible
for imperfect formal contracting to crowd out relational contracting and cause a welfare loss.15
relationships begun before 1989, the potential sample is 1733.  Of these, complete data are
available for the basic set of variables for 1449 observations.
19  In all the regressions we include
dummy variables to control for sector and country. Further controls are discussed below.
The variables are summarized on Table 4.  On average, more than half of the bill is paid
after delivery. Delayed payment is most common in Poland, where an average of 84% of the
purchase price is paid after delivery and 71% is paid more than a week after delivery, and least
common in Russia, where only 12% of the purchase price is paid after delivery and 4% more than
a week later (Table 4).  Over the sample, 29% pay everything on or before delivery and 49% pay
everything within a week after delivery. We use both the percentage of bills paid after delivery and
the percentage paid more than a week after delivery as indications of cooperation among trading
partners. A longer delay in payment presumably indicates a greater level of trust. However, we
expect to find little difference the two measures of credit. Where legal enforcement of debts is
questionable, the major difference is not between varying terms of credit but between giving credit
and not giving it; whenever payment is delayed trust is needed.
The percentage of the bill paid after delivery is the outcome of both the supply of credit
and the demand. The reduced-form equation is:
TCi  =  " + $Ri + (Si +  *Bi  + NDi  + :i ,
where TC is the observed trade credit, Ri is a vector of  variables characterizing the relationship,
Si  is a vector of seller characteristics, Bi is a vector of buyer characteristics, Di is a vector of
industry and country dummies, and :i is random noise. The subscripts i  represent the (i=1…n)
buyer-seller pairs in the sample. Our focus is the willingness of sellers to grant credit, given
repayment uncertainties represented by the vector of relationship and seller characteristics. Since
our survey does not contain information on the vector of buyer characteristics, these variables will
be missing from our regressions and we will estimate:
                                                       
19A firm may have two customer relationships in the data, but a single manufacturer-customer relationship appears
only once. We treat the observations as independent.  Appendix B reproduces the regressions in column 1 of Table
5 (Table 7) splitting the sample into oldest and newest customers (suppliers).  The results are consistent with those
reported in the main body of the paper.16
TCi  =  " + $Ri + (Si  + NDi  + :i.
The estimated coefficients of the relationship and seller characteristics would be affected by the
missing variables if the buyer characteristics are correlated with these measured characteristics.
We see no reason to expect that this is the case. The buyer's demand for credit does not depend
on information the seller has about the buyer from social or family networks, or the seller's
attitude toward courts, or the seller’s membership in trade associations, and so on. Given this, we
expect the missing variables add noise that is uncorrelated with the variables of interest. Thus we
shall interpret the regression coefficients as representing the willingness of sellers to grant credit.
Furthermore, it appears that, unlike in the United States, trade credit is offered at
relatively low interest rates, which presumably means that buyers will accept any trade credit
offered, so the amount of measured trade credit tends to reflect supply rather than demand.
According to our respondents, in Poland there is sometimes a negotiable discount for cash. For
delayed payments, interest is typically charged at 0.09% per day, which is not much higher than
the interest rate on bank loans, around 25% per year in the fall of 1997. Romania has a regulation
that trade credit is interest-free up to ten days and thereafter incurs interest at 0.15% per day,
which is comparable to the commercial banks’ average nominal lending rate of 55% per year.
20
Among 20 interviewees sampled in Romania, one-fourth said they receive discounts for cash
payments, while three-fourths said there is no discount for cash.
3.1   The basic contract-enforcement regressions
We begin by examining the decision to allow customers to pay part of the bill after
delivery. The regression reported in Column 1 of Table 5 is a probit, with the dependent variable
equal to 1 if any portion of the bill is paid after delivery and zero otherwise. Just over two-thirds
                                                       
20 The Polish interest rates are reported at http://www.meximedia.com/ECO/22pol.html and at
http://www.oecd.org/publications/observer/213/indicato-eng.htm. The Romanian regulation and prevailing interest
rate come from http://www.businesseurope.com/romania/markrom.htm.  Perhaps the high US interest rates reflect adverse
selection: firms that a good credit risk take out bank loans instead of  long-term trade credit.  In the transition countries, bank
loans are harder to get so it is not just the higher-risk firms that receive trade credit.17
(69%) of the relationships with customers involve some delayed payment. The variables are
shown in three groups: those measuring customer search costs; those measuring manufacturer
information and communication; and those measuring access to courts and trade associations. All
of the independent variables have the expected sign and are significant at the .05 level or higher.
Customer search costs are proxied for by the number of competitors located near (within
1 km) the interviewed manufacturer.  Most manufacturers (79%) report no manufacturers of
similar products located nearby and, on average, there is less than one firm located within 1 km of
manufacturers (Table 4). Each additional competitor located nearby reduces the probability that
credit is offered by 2%.
The longer a manufacturer has dealt with a given customer, the better able it is to evaluate
the credit risk. Case studies accompanying a similar survey in Vietnam suggested that learning
through trading is important (see McMillan and Woodruff 1998b).  Here, we find the likelihood of
giving credit increases (at a decreasing rate) with the duration of the relationship. During the first
3 years of a relationship (slightly more the sample mean duration of 2.5 years), the probability of
giving credit increases by 21%. We should be careful in attributing the duration effect solely to
learning about the trading partner. Duration may also reflect selection. Suppose trust is instant in
some relationships, and credit is offered immediately. If those relationships have a greater
probability of surviving, then our duration estimates will reflect the fact that relationships of
longer duration involve trading partners that are inherently more trusted, and the duration
estimates will be biased upward. Other than controlling for the level of initial trust as best we can,
through the measures of initial information, there is little we can do with our data to separate
learning from selection effects. But this potential bias should be kept in mind when interpreting
the results.
21
Manufacturers may also learn about the trustworthiness of trading partners by talking to
others. We identify relationships as arising from two different types of information networks,
                                                       
21 The problem parallels the tenure debate in the wage determination literature. OLS estimates of tenure effects
may be biased because of job matching or cohort effects. See Altonji and Williams (1997) for a discussion.18
which we refer to as business networks and social networks. Managers were asked how they first
made contact with their oldest and newest customers. Firms came into contact with about 45% of
their private sector customers through information from other manufacturers. More than three-
fourths of these were identified as other customers of the manufacturer, with the remainder being
suppliers, competitors or other firms. About 18% of the customers in the sample are managed by
a family member or friend of the interviewed manager.
22 This percentage is highest in Romania,
where previous social connections characterize 30% of customer relationships, and lowest in
Poland where only 6% of customers are managed by a family member or friend.  Firms identified
through business networks are 12% more likely to receive credit and those identified through
social networks 14% more likely to receive credit, compared to customers identified without the
help of these networks.
Belief in courts and membership in trade associations are also positively associated with
credit. Firms saying that courts can be used to enforce contracts are 8% more likely to grant
credit; members of trade associations providing customer or supplier services (information about
the identity and location of new customers; information about the trustworthiness of
customers/suppliers; and/or dispute arbitration) are 6% more likely to grant credit.
23
These results indicate that institutions—courts and trade associations—matter.  But the
their measured effects are smaller than the measured effects of relational contracting. The
coefficient on courts is smaller than that on the variables proxying business or social networks.
Also, the estimated probability of granting credit increases by more over the course of the first
year of a relationship than it increases if the courts become available. There are, however, several
reasons to view these comparisons with caution. First, we might expect there to be more
                                                       
22 Firms were allowed to indicate more than one source of initial information, though few did so. In only nine
relationships did managers indicate that both business and social networks were used in locating a customer.  The
most frequent responses of the remaining firms were “he contacted us” (almost half the remaining responses), and
“through an advertisement” and  “met at a market fair,” each about 10% of the remaining responses.
23 These results are little changed when customers which are state-owned firms or are located in another country
are included in the sample. Trade associations have slightly more impact on credit and courts slightly less impact.
The duration effect is smaller when pre-reform relationships are included.19
measurement error in the court variable than in the other variables, because of the hypothetical
nature of the question used to create it. As discussed above, the measured duration effect may
also be biased upward.  Second, since the effectiveness of courts varies across countries, some of
the effect of courts may be captured by the country dummy variables. Excluding the country
dummies does increase the size of the effect of courts, but only from 8% to 9%. Finally, courts
and trade associations may substitute for one another. A term interacting the two is negative when
included in the regression ($=-0.16, t=2.30). Its inclusion increases the effect of courts for firms
which are not members of trade associations ($=0.12, t=3.52) and the effect of trade association
membership for firms which do not have confidence in courts ($=0.17, t=3.05). Thus, it appears
that networks, relationships and institutions—courts and trade associations—all have similar
effects on the trade credit decision.
24
The next three columns present regressions using alternative definitions of the dependent
variable. In Column 2, the dependent variable is the proportion of the bill paid after delivery.
Since about a third of the sample (32%) pays nothing after delivery and almost half (47%) pays
the entire bill after delivery, the regression is estimated as a two-tailed tobit. The coefficients
shown on Table 5 are the marginal effect in the non-censored range of the sample. Thus,
conditional on receiving some credit, a customer located through a business or social network
pays about 10 percentage points more of its bill after delivery.  In Column 3, credit is defined as
the proportion of the bill paid 8 days or more after delivery.  In Column 4, we multiply the
percentage of the bill paid after delivery by the percentage of the manufacturer’s sales which go to
the specified customer. This gives a measure of the dollar amount of the credit, relative to the
manufacturer’s sales, and provides an alternative measure of the risk faced by the manufacturer.
By the measure used in Column 4, a customer buying 1% of the manufacturer’s production and
                                                       
24 Significant country-level effects remain after the effects of the independent variables have been accounted for.
Taking Poland as the base country, the probability that credit is granted is lower for reasons unexplained by the
regressions in Slovakia ($=-.17, t=4.31), Romania ($=-.36, t=8.67), Russia ($=-.72, t=12.89) and Ukraine ($=-
.46, t=7.18).20
paying 75% of its bill after delivery represents less credit risk than a customer buying 10% of
production and paying 50% of its bill after delivery.
All of the core variables are robust to any of these definitions of credit, with two
exceptions. Trade association membership loses its significance when credit is measured by
payments made 8 days or more after delivery (Column 3) and both trade association membership
and our measure of customer search costs drop below the .10 level of significance when the sales-
weighted credit measure is used (Column 4).
We next test the robustness of the results by adding a series of controls for firm, customer
and manager characteristics.  There are missing responses for each of the additional control
variables; when all of them are included, the sample size is reduced to 1148.  The remaining
regressions are run using this sample, and using the proportion of the bill paid after delivery as the
dependent variable.  The regression reported in Column 2 is repeated in Column 5 with the
smaller sample for comparison purposes.  The smaller sample has a modest effect on the results
(see Column 5). Membership in a trade association is no longer significant; the significance level
of the ability to use courts falls as well, though it remains above the .10 level.
The additional controls in Columns 6 and 7 include variables suggested by the trade credit
literature--measures of the age and size of the firm, access to outside credit (measured by
receiving a bank loan in 1996), a measure of the ability to price discriminate (whether prices are
set through bargaining with customers), whether the customer is a retailer or wholesaler, whether
the customer is foreign-owned, and whether the customer is located in the same city as the
manufacturer. The regression also includes an indication of the amount of credit the manufacturer
receives from the two suppliers identified in the survey.  This variable is calculated as the average
of the percent of the bill paid after delivery to the oldest and most recent supplier. Receiving
credit from suppliers may allow a firm to grant credit to customers by relaxing its capital
constraint.  The regression indicates that customers pay an additional one percent of their bill after
delivery for each five percent of the bill paid by manufacturers to their suppliers after delivery
($=0.22, t=6.37).  The size and significance of the coefficient suggest the variable is measuring21
something more than a relaxation of the capital constraint. The level of credit received from
suppliers may also be an indication of the norms in the manufacturer’s industry.  This provides
control for sample heterogeneity in addition to the industry and country dummies.
Finally, the regression reported in Column 7 replaces belief in the courts with experience
with the courts. From the perspective of theory, the ability to use courts is the relevant variable. If
both trading partners believe that courts are effective, the threat to use them will be sufficient to
prevent either side from reneging on agreements. But most firms in the survey report that they
have had at least one dispute with a trading partner, and about 40% of those firms say the courts
played some role in resolving the dispute (Table 1). Experience with the courts may be taken as a
stronger indication of their effectiveness.
25  Court experience has an insignificant effect on the
level of credit granted.
The last regression also adds three factors which may affect the ability to sustain
cooperation with a customer but which may be endogenous—the frequency with which goods are
delivered, talking with other suppliers of the customer, and visiting the customer before the first
sale. The construction of the variables is described in Appendix A. Because of the potential
endogeneity, the coefficients on these variables should be interpreted with some caution. Of the
variables added in column 7, only visiting prior to the sale is significantly associated with granting
credit ($=0.72, t=2.33).
26 Visiting with the customer before the first sale is a potentially important
means of gathering information about the customer.  Prior visits may also indicate a previous
social connection (and indeed, visits are positively correlated with information from social
                                                       
25 There are two concerns with this interpretation. First, we don’t know what role the courts played in the
resolution of the dispute. In Mexico, for example, manufacturers said they often used courts to certify losses for tax
purposes, after giving up any hope of recovering the loss (Woodruff 1998). Second, more than 40% of the firms
said they have never had a dispute. These firms are coded the same as firms who have had disputes but not used
the courts. Coding firms who said they had never had a dispute as not having used the court may increase the noise
in our measure. But excluding these firms from the sample makes little difference. The effect of experience with
courts on credit remains insignificant ($=2.66, t=1.01).
26 When visits by the manufacturer to the customer and visits by the customer to the manufacturer are separated,
only the former is significantly associated with the level of credit.  This suggests that the variable is picking up
information gathering rather than just previous social contacts.22
networks). Neither the frequency of delivery nor talking with other suppliers is significant at the
.10 level, and the latter variable does not have the expected sign.
The additional controls have little impact on the variables of interest. Belief in the courts is
the only variable whose significance changes, with the variable dropping below the .10 level of
significance when the additional variables are added and the sample size is reduced.
27
The availability of “extra-legal” or private enforcement organizations (such as the mafia)
may also affect a firm’s willingness to grant credit to its customers.  Because our survey contains
limited information on various private enforcement options, we have not included measures of
private enforcement in the basic set of variables. We used the questions described in Section 2.4
above to create two variables that provide some control for the availability of private
enforcement.  When added to the basic regression reported in column 2, “other third party
enforcement” is insignificant ($=0.79, t=0.23). Using “an informal private agency specializing in
such cases” also has an insigniicant effect on credit ($=-6.11, t=0.88). More important for our
main hypotheses, the inclusion of these two variables has no effect on the sign or significance of
the other contract-enforcement variables.
3.2   Interaction effects
The regressions on Table 5 consider the effect of each contract enforcement mechanism
independently.  But it is reasonable to expect that the various means of enforcing contracts
interact with one another.  For example, information learned about the customer in the course of a
trading relationship may substitute for initial information from social or business networks.  If so,
then the effect of information should diminish over time.  On the other hand, if a network provides
the ability to sanction a trading partner by damaging her reputation, then the networks will have
enduring effects on the level of trust.  We use a series of interaction terms to study the
interdependence of the various ways of enforcing contracts.
                                                       
27 This is apparently at least in part because of the interaction between courts and trade associations. When the
courts-trade association interaction term is included, courts is significant at the .10 level ($=5.56, t=1.85). Trade
associations remain insignificant ($=8.76, t=1.49), as does the interaction term ($=-6.79, t=1.07).23
We consider first how the duration of the trading relationship affects the information,
search cost, and institutional variables.  We do this by interacting duration and its square with
each of the two information variables (family networks and social networks), with the customer
search cost variable (number of competitors nearby) and with the two main institutional variables
(courts and trade associations).  The interaction terms are added to the regression in column 1 of
Table 5.  We use the coefficients to create Graph 1A, which shows how the effect of access to
institutions changes as the trading relationship matures, and Graph 1B, which shows the time-
variant nature of information variables.
28
Both of the courts variables and both of the networks variables have much greater effects
at the beginning of  a trading relationship.  The relationship itself appears to be a substitute for the
assurance gained from either institutions or initial information.  For example, firms expressing
confidence in the courts allow their customers to pay almost 7 percentage points more of their
bills after delivery at the start of a relationship, but only 3 percentage points more after 6 years of
dealing with them.
29 We calculated chi-square tests for the joint significance of each pair of  time-
dependent variables. Only for business networks (P
2=7.40, D=0.02) does the chi-square test reject
the hypothesis of time-independent effects. For social networks (P
2=4.26, D=0.12), search costs
(P
2=0.34, D=0.84), courts (P
2=0.87, D=0.65) and trade associations (P
2=0.44, D=0.80), the time
trend is not significant.
30
3.3     Summary of trade-credit regressions
Trust between trading partners is supported by both institutions and relational contracting.
Manufacturers who express confidence in courts allow their customers to pay about 6 percentage
                                                       
28 The regression results on which Graphs 1A and 1B are based are available from the authors.
29 We also tested for interactions between court enforcement and the search cost and information variables. We
found no significant interactions.
30 A similar exercise indicates that the effect of  visits before the first sale is also short-lived. At the start of a
relationship, each prior visit increases credit by 2 percentage points. The effect of visits goes to zero over the first
five years of the relationship. The time trend is significant (P
2=7.92, D=0.02). This last result is consistent with the
finding, reported in footnote 26, that visits from the customer to the manufacturer have no effect on credit.24
points more of their bill after delivery. Trade associations have a smaller positive effect (about 4
percentage points) and their effect is less robust. Courts and trade associations appear to
substitute for one another.
While institutions matter, relationships and information are at least equally important.
During the first three years of a trading relationship, the level of credit increases by about 13
percentage points.  Where the manager had a previous social relationship with the customer, or
where connections are made through business networks, the level of credit is also about 10
percentage points higher.
These findings are robust to alternative definitions of the dependent variable, and to
changes in specification. Appendix B reports the results of regressions run at the individual
country level. Most of the findings hold in each of the countries, though with smaller samples the
significance levels are generally lower. Finally, the estimated effects of relationships are largely
consistent with the results for Vietnam reported in McMillan and Woodruff (1998).  In Vietnam,
the proportion of the bill paid after delivery increased by an estimated 17 percentage points during
the first three years of the relationship, compared to 13 percentage points in Eastern Europe.
Each additional competitor located nearby decreased the level of delayed payment by about 1
percent in the Vietnam survey, compared to 1-2 percent here.
31  And contacts made through
business networks resulted in 11-17 percetage points more credit in Vietnam, somewhat larger
than the 10 percentage point impact estimated for the five Eastern Europe countries.
The importance of both institutions and networks is greatest at the start of a relationship,
and declines as the relationship matures.
32  This raises the question of whether an inability to rely
on institutions may prevent relationships from starting.  We examine this question in the next
                                                       
31 McMillan and Woodruff also measure customer search cost with a variable indicating that the manufacturers
“most important competitor” is located nearby.  That question was not included in the Eastern European survey.
32 This statement depends on a time series implication drawn from cross sectional data, and should be
appropriately discounted.25
section by asking: When will a manufacturer sustain a relationship with an existing supplier in the
face of a lower price offered by a previously unknown supplier?
4.  Determinants of Supplier Loyalty
The cost of gaining cooperation by means of relationships is that, in order to maintain
existing relationships, firms may pass up deals offered to them by new trading partners. As
discussed above, firms were asked how they would respond if an unknown supplier offered them
the same input as an existing supplier at a 10% lower price. Many said they would decline this
offer. In this section we examine the determinants of a firm’s loyalty to its current supplier. The
theory we use to organize the data is similar to that underlying the trade credit regressions. In
both cases, trust is an important part of what we are measuring. But the trust in an existing
supplier, or lack of trust in a new supplier, is of a different nature than the trust in a customer. If a
customer is granted credit, the payment can be made only by that customer. So the trust in a
credit relationship is trust in that specific customer. If bridges are burned with an existing supplier
and the new supplier subsequently fails to deliver an input, then the relevant question is, How
easily can third supplier be found? The trust in a supply relationship has to be measured relative
the market.
  Accepting the lower-priced offer from an unknown supplier involves risk. If the new
relationship fails, production may be hampered and reputation with customers compromised. We
consider the same three sets of variables affecting the cost firms are willing to pay to maintain
existing relationships (see Table 3). First, if the cost of searching for an alternative (third) supplier
is high, then firms will work to maintain existing relationships. We found this to be the case in
relationships with customers, and we expect it to hold for relationships with suppliers as well.
Second, the level of information about and confidence in the existing supplier will also affect the
manufacturer's efforts to maintain existing relationships. We expect to find firms investing more
heavily to maintain relationships with more trusted suppliers. Finally, where institutions like courts
and trade associations function, confidence in new suppliers can be gained more quickly and new26
cooperative relationships formed more easily. These institutions should therefore reduce the
loyalty to existing suppliers.  The sample means of all of the independent variables are shown on
Table 6.
Table 7 presents results from probits using three different dependent variables. Columns 1-
4 are ordered probits with acceptance of the offer from the new supplier coded 1, rejection of the
offer coded 3 and the "buy from both" response coded as 2.  The first regression uses a limited set
and the second an extended set of independent variables.  The third adds a set of controls for
manager characteristics; the fourth replaces confidence in courts with experience using courts.
Finally, column 5 compares rejection of the offer (strict loyalty) to the other two responses, while
column 6 compares partial or full rejection with outright acceptance (lower loyalty). The
coefficients reported in columns 5 and 6 are the changes in the probability of the dependent
variable being one given a change in the independent variable. As with customer credit, we limit
the sample to relationships with domestic, privately-owned suppliers begun before 1989.  We add
controls for industry, country and firm characteristics to all of the regressions, as described in the
note on Table 7.
33
The regressions include three variables to control for the complexity of relationships with
suppliers.
34 The most direct measure of search cost we have comes from a question asked
manufacturers, "If this supplier failed to delivery goods as promised, how long would it take you
to find an alternative source of inputs?" Second, a minority (11%) of the suppliers produce a good
sold only to the interviewed manufacturer, suggesting a higher level of relationship-specific
investment, and suppliers who are more difficult to replace. Finally, in 32% of the cases, the
manufacturer has no alternative suppliers for the imput.  In these cases, the risk of accepting the
                                                       
33 Country level regressions are reported in Appendix B.
34Since the suppliers themselves were not interviewed, we do not know how many similar firms are located near
the supplier. Thus we are forced to use other proxies for search costs.27
deal outright is increased.
35 In each of the 6 regressions, the search variables all have the expected
positive signs. In all but one case (column 6), these variables are significant at the .05 level or
above.  Moreover, these variables have a large impact on loyalty.  For example, where the
supplier produces a good sold only to the interviewed manufacturer, rejection of the new offer is
17% more likely and outright acceptance of the offer is 17% less likely (columns 5 and 6).
Cooperation with an existing supplier may be sustained through bilateral sanctions. More
frequent interactions with suppliers (represented by the frequency of delivery) make cooperation
easier to sustain. Manufacturers should be less likely to abandon these relationships, and we find
that they are. A supplier from whom goods are purchased weekly instead of biweekly is 2% less
likely to be abandoned. When firms have particularly good information about and a high level of
trust in an existing supplier, we expect them to be less willing to abandon the relationship. We
find that relationships of longer duration are less likely to be abandoned, though the effect is not
large and not always significant. The probability of rejecting the lower-priced offer increases by
1% for each year of experience trading with the existing supplier.
The use of networks and third-party information sharing also increases loyalty.  Loyalty is
greater when the supplier is managed by a family member or friend, with manufacturers about 8%
less likely to switch from such suppliers. This effect is significant at the .10 level in three of the
regressions, and nearly so in the other three. Previous social connections may also be signaled by
pre-relationship visits. These visits also are also associated with higher levels of loyalty. Ongoing
communication among suppliers, represented by the manufacturer’s indication that his other
suppliers would hear about any dispute he had with this supplier, also results in higher levels of
loyalty.  The effect of gossip is only marginally significant. Moreover we find no effect on loyalty
when the initial information about a supplier comes from a business network. These findings
                                                       
35As would be expected, there is a positive correlation between the direct search measure and the other measures,
with having no alternative supplier (.36) and the supplier producing a good sold only to the manufacturer (.20)
having the highest correlation.28
suggest that informal enforcement comes at a price; it increases the likelihood that a lower priced
supplier will find a reduced market for his goods.
We are most interested in what effect courts and trade associations have on the willingness
to buy from unknown suppliers. In this regard, the data are clear. Expressing confidence in the
ability to rely on the courts and having used the court in resolving the last dispute with a trading
partner are both associated with less loyalty to existing suppliers. Confidence in the courts
reduces the probability of rejecting the deal by 6%. In the ordered probit, experience with the
courts has a larger and more significant effect than confidence in courts.
36 Membership in a trade
association has a somewhat larger effect, increasing the likelihood of accepting the new offer in
part or in whole by 9%. The data show that these institutions have statistically and economically
significant effects on the level of market friction.
Controlling for the complexity of the relationship and the level of information about the
existing supplier, firms that can rely on institutions are substantially more likely to abandon
existing suppliers for a better deal.  The fact that firms that cannot rely on the courts or trade
associations to enforce contracts are likely to pay a cost to maintain relationships with known
suppliers implies that inefficiencies result from the absence of these institutions.
37
5. Conclusion
Our data show that repeated bilateral trade, market friction, networks, courts and trade
associations are all contributing significantly to contract enforcement in Russia, Ukraine, Poland,
Romania, and Slovakia.  But the costs of these differ.  Courts and trade associations increase
cooperation and also increase the willingness to take a chance with an unknown supplier.  Where
courts function well, suppliers who are able to improve their efficiency and lower their prices will
be rewarded for doing so. Networks increase cooperation but reduce the willingness to buy from
                                                       
36 When experience with the courts replaces confidence in courts, the effect is also larger in column 5 ($=-.06,
t=2.58) and column 6 ($=-.10, t=2.72).
37 Firms receiving bank loans are more loyal than those without loans, which seems a perverse result.  This may
reflect an effect modeled by den Haan, Ramey and Watson (1998).  In the Ramey and Watson model, firms that are
credit-constrained may be forced to abandon relationships when they would otherwise prefer not to do so.29
previously unknown suppliers. Where networks govern interfirm relationships, the rewards to--
and incentives for--low cost suppliers will be smaller.
Our results suggest that relational contracting and the courts are substitutes. Two pieces
of evidence support this. First, the courts have a smaller effect on trade credit in longstanding
relationships than in new relationships. Second, firms that say the courts are effective are less
loyal to their existing suppliers, presumably because the assurance the courts give them substitutes
for the assurance they are getting from the ongoing relationship with the current supplier.
How will the relative role of the courts and relational contracting change as these legal
systems develop?  The following are logical implications of our empirical findings:
 • Since the courts and relationships are substitutes, the role of the courts relative to relational
contracting can be expected to increase over time, both as these countries develop more workable
legal systems and as falling search costs weaken the interfirm ties.
 • This larger role of the courts should result in increased efficiency, both because some
transactions (those involving large, infrequent orders) cannot be sustained by repeated-game
incentives, and because relationships entail inefficiencies through sometimes excluding low-cost
new entrants.
It does not follow, however, that relational contracting will become less common as the
economy develops and the legal system becomes more effective. More advanced technology tends
to mean greater specificity of investment, and therefore more locked-in supplier-customer
relationships. For some goods, the courts cannot be resorted to because, with high-technology
products or with goods that have subtle quality characteristics, it is often difficult or impossible
for a third party to verify that the contract has been breached. Our data show such an effect across
the five countries. The managers were asked, if they refused accept delivery of goods from a
particular supplier, how long it would take that supplier to find another customer. One of the
options given for answers was that “it would be impossible.” If we take this as meaning the
product is specific to the customer, the incidence of specificity is higher in Slovakia and Poland
and lower in the other three countries (see Table 2).  They were also asked how long it would30
take them to find alternative supplies in the event a specific supplier failed to deliver goods. If we
take the answers “ a day or less” and  “less than a week” as a measure of low search costs, then
search costs are higher in Ukraine and Russia than in the other three countries (Table 2).
Combined, these measures suggest that Poland and Slovakia, the most advanced of the five
economies, have relatively high specificity and low search costs; Russia and Ukraine, the least
advanced, have high search costs and low specificity; and Romania is in between, with low search
costs but low specificity.
The incidence of relationship-based contracting, therefore, might rise or fall as the
economy develops.  It depends whether the increasing specificity of investment outweighs the
lowering of search costs and the increasing dependability of the legal system.31
Appendix A:  The Sample and the Survey
The data reported here are from surveys undertaken in Russia and Ukraine in May and
June 1997, and in Poland, Romania and Slovakia in September-December 1997.  Pilot surveys
were undertaken in Russia and Ukraine in January-February 1997, in Poland and Slovakia in
March 1997 and in Romania in August 1997.  The sample of about 300 firms in each country was
drawn from a list provided by the country’s Statistical Institute.  In order to increase the cross-
country comparability of the sample, the initial selection was limited to one medium-sized city in
each country: Katowice (Poland), Brasov (Romania), Bratislava (Slovakia), Volgograd (Russia)
and Dnepopetrovsk (Ukraine).  Only in Slovakia did we have trouble identifying a large enough
sample of firms meeting the established size criteria who were willing to participate.  In the final
sample, about one-quarter of the Slovakian firms are located in Bratislava, one-quarter in Kosice,
and the remaining half are spread across seven other cities.  Participation rates were high among
the firms contacted—in excess of 70% in Poland and Romania, and 68% in Slovakia.  We believe
the resulting sample is reasonably representative of small and medium-sized manufacturing firms
in each country, though it is not a census.
Table A-1 provides a summary of the characteristics of firms in the sample. Most were
started in 1990 or after; many within 3 years of the survey.  Only in Poland was a significant share
of the firms started before 1988. The majority of firms in Russia and Ukraine were privatized, or
spun off from state-owned enterprises; the majority in the other three countries started from
scratch, with none of their equipment coming from state-owned enterprises.
At least 85% of the managers in each of the countries report that they have previous
experience working in an SOE.  Previous work experience in the private sector is much more
common for startup firms than spin-offs. At least 29% of startup managers have prior private
sector experience in every country except Romania.  In all five countries the educational
background of managers is similar; the average amount of schooling is 15-16 years everywhere.
Measured by employment, in all five countries privatized firms were much larger in their
first year of operation than the startups.  The startups were smallest at birth in Slovakia and32
largest in Poland, though there is not a large difference among the countries in the average size of
startups in their first year.
In Poland, Romania and Slovakia, the sample was drawn so that one-quarter of the firms
were from the same industry, metal parts and products.  Nearly a fifth of the Ukrainian firms and
one-eighth of the Russian firms are also produce metal products. The remaining firms are spread
across manufacturing sectors, as shown in Appendix Table 1.
The survey was administered face-to-face by interviewers contracted in each country, with
responses provided by the general manager or deputy general manager of each firm. The largest
part of the survey is a series of questions related to the longest running and newest customer and
supplier relationships. There are also sections on the resolution of contract disputes with
customers and suppliers, access to formal bank finance, hidden and unofficial payments, and a set
of general questions regarding the size and profitability of the firms.
The Survey
The most relevant survey questions are listed below.  In many cases, we also note how the
question was used to create the dependent or independent variables (in italics).
Questions asked about oldest and newest customer:
(55) How often do you deliver goods to this customer?
1 Daily                        {310}
2 Weekly
3 Every 2 weeks
4 Monthly
5 Every 1-3 months
6 Less often
Frequency of delivery is 5 for daily, 4 for weekly, and so on.33
(61) Before you began working with this customer, what was your primary source of information about
this firm/person?
YES NO
1  It is managed or owned by my family 1 2 Q 63 {316}
2  It is managed or owned by a friend 1 2 Q 63 {317}
3  I used to work for this firm 1 2 Q 63 {318}
4 From a previous business acquaintance 1 2 Yes Q 62, No Q 63 {319}
5  Through a government agency 1 2 Q 63 {320}
6  Through a bank 1 2 Q 63 {321}
7  Through a credit rating agency 1 2 Q 63 {322}
8  Through a business association 1 2 Q 63 {323}
9  Other: (specify)
                            ……………………..
1 2 Q 63 {324}
                                                                                                                              {.......325}
The most common “other” responses were “he contacted us” (44%), “advertisement” (12%),
“met at a market fair” (9%) and “we found the company ourselves” (8%).  Social networks are
indicated by yes responses to either of the first 2 questions; business networks by yes responses to
3, 4 or 8.
 (63)  How many times did your company’s representatives visit this customer’s factory or store before
you sold to him?
                                                                               1 Never                      {327}
                                                                    2 1-3 times
                                                                    3 4-6 times
                                                                    4 More than 6 times
(64) How many times did this customer’s representatives visit your factory before you sold to him?
                                                        1 Never                       {328}
                                             2 1-3 times
                                             3 4-6 times
                                             4 More than 6 times
Questions 63 and 64 were combined for the “visits with customer” variable. “Never” was given
a value of 0; “1-3 times” a value of 2; “4-6 times” a value of 5; and “More than 6 times” a value of 7.
Thus, the visits variable takes on values from 0 to 14.
(67) What proportion of the customer’s payment is made at the following times:
1 ___   %When the order is placed                 {334-35}
2 ___   %On delivery                 {336-37}
3 ___   %1-7 days after delivery                             {338-39}
4 ___   %8-30 days after delivery                             {340-41}
5 ____ %More than 30 days after delivery                            {342-43}
            6 ____ %Other Schedule (Specify)
Firms specifying some amount for “other schedule” were dropped from the sample (42 cases or
1.5% of the sample). Payment after delivery is the sum of 3, 4 and 5; payment eight days or more after
delivery is the sum of 4 and 5.34
 (76) Currently, does your company talk with other suppliers of this customer?




5 Yes, but infrequently
Response 1 was given a value of 0, response 5 a value of 1, 4 a value of 2, 3 a value of 4 and 2 a
value of 5.
Questions asked about oldest and newest supplier:
(121) Does this supplier make
                                                        1 The exact same product for other firms,            {514}
                                               2 Is the input specific to your firm?
(130) Before you began working with him, what were your sources of information about this supplier?
YES NO
1  It is managed or owned by my family 1 2 Q 132 {523}
2  It is managed or owned by a friend 1 2 Q 132 {524}
3  I used to work for this firm 1 2 Q 132 {525}
4  From a previous business acquaintance 1 2 Yes Q 131, No Q132 {526}
5  Through a government agency 1 2 Q 132 {527}
6  Through a bank 1 2 Q 132 {528}
7  Through a credit rating agency 1 2 Q 132 {529}
8  Through a business association 1 2 Q 132 {530}
9  Other: (specify)
                            ……………………..
1 2 Q 132 {531}
Same as question 61 above.  The most common “other” responses were “advertisement” (30%),
“He contacted us” (19%), “met at a fair” (11%), and “found company ourselves (7%).
 (137) Do you have other suppliers of this input? Yes             1
                                                                                                   No               2
(138)  If this supplier failed to deliver, how long would it take you to find replacement supplies?
                                 1 A day or less
        2 More than a day, less than a week
        3 More than a week, less than a month
        4 More than a month
                                 5  Would be impossible
Response 1 was coded as 1, response 2 as 2, and so on.
(146) If another firm you have never purchased from offered to supply this input for a price 10% less
than this supplier, would you purchase from the new firm instead of this supplier?
                                                      Yes                       1
No                        2
Buy from both       335
(147) If your company had a dispute with this supplier, would your other suppliers find out about it?
                                                          Yes         1                      {563}
                                                          No          2
This question was used for the variable “other suppliers would know about dispute.”
Contract Disputes:
 (183) Even if you never had a contract dispute could you please tell me which of the following third
parties  can enforce an agreement with a customer or supplier?
YES NO
1  Court 1 2
{707}
2  The national government 1 2 {708}
3  The local government 1 2 {709}
4 A non-governmental organisation (such as a trade association 1 2 {710}
5 Other 1 2 {711}
6 There is no one 1 2 {712}
Confidence in courts is indicated by a yes response to question 183_1.
 (186) Has a customer ever failed to pay for a product after you have delivered it?
                                          Yes         1          {720}
                                          No           2
(187) Has a supplier ever refused to accept the return of defective merchandise or to refund money for
merchandise returned because of low quality?
                                          Yes         1           {721}
                                          No           2
(189) What organisations assisted in the case of your most recent payment  dispute?
YES NO
1  Courts 1 2 {725}
2  Local government authorities 1 2 {726}
3  A formal private agency specialising in such cases 1 2 {727}
4  An informal private agency specialising is such cases 1 2 {728}
5  No one 1 2 {729}
A yes response to question 189_1 indicates the courts were used in the most recent dispute with a
trading partner.  For a no response to 189_1, or where the firm reports that it has not had a dispute with
a trading partner, use of courts takes a value of 0.
General:
(11) Number of full time employees at the end of first half of 1997...........................{109-111}36






Metal parts and products
Wood products and furniture
Food products and beverages

















Used to create 10 industry dummies.
(201) How many other producers of goods similar to yours are located
Within 1 km of your factory........................     {758-59}
            Within same city......................................................................                 {760-61}
(206) Is your company a member of any type of business or trade association?
                                Yes           1                      {768}
                                No            2
(207) What benefits do companies get from business or trade associations?
YES NO
Information about technology 1 2 {769}
Information about the identity and location of new
Customers/suppliers
1 2 {770}
Information about the trustworthiness of customers/suppliers 1 2 {771}
Contract and/or dispute arbitration 1 2 {772}
Other (specify)
                          ..............................................
1 2 {773}
                                                                                                                               {..........774}
The trade association variable is one if the response to question 206 is yes and there is at least
one yes response to the second, third, or fourth part of question 207.
 (242) If it were possible for you to decrease the price of your main product by 10% (without your
competitors changing their prices), how much do you think your sales would increase as a percentage
of your current sales?
                                                                                                 ...........................%       {907-8}37
Appendix B: Regression Results by Country
Courts and trade associations may be more effective in some countries than in others;
social networks may become less important as market institutions develop. Our last set of
regressions repeat the basic trade credit and loyalty regressions using the subsample from each
country. The results are shown on Table B-1 (trade credit) and Table B-2 (supplier loyalty).
Because of the limited number of complete observations in Russia and Ukraine, these countries
are combined for the trade credit regressions. Even combined, there are not enough observations
to run loyalty regressions for Russia and Ukraine.
Not surprisingly, the smaller sample sizes yield fewer statistically significant results.  With
a few exceptions, discussed below, all of the trade credit variables (Table B-1) retain the expected
sign in each of the countries. The effects of business networks are notably consistent across these
countries, and always significant at the .10 level. Relationship duration is significant in the three
Eastern European countries, but not in Russia and Ukraine. Social networks have the biggest
impact in Romania and in Russia and Ukraine, where they are most commonly used (see Table 4),
and no impact in Poland, where their use is infrequent. Customer search costs have a significant
effect only in Slovakia, though in Poland the measured effect is nearly the same magnitude as the
overall sample.
The results for institutions are more mixed. Neither institutional variable is significant in
Poland, and trade association membership has the wrong sign.
38 In Slovakia, courts have a large,
significant effect ($=11.09, t=2.64), while trade associations have a smaller, insignificant effect
($=4.06, t=0.81). The situation is reversed in Romania, where trade associations have a positive
effect ($=6.80, t=1.68) and courts have a positive but insignificant effect ($=5.72, t=0.92), and in
Russia and Ukraine, where again trade associations have a significant impact  ($=10.99, t=2.57)
and courts do not ($=4.21, t=0.99).
                                                       
38 Experience using courts is a stronger indicator of credit in Poland, though this variable does not reach
significance ($=5.40, t=1.39).38
In the loyalty regressions, the search cost variables retain the expected sign with one
exception (Romania and the length of time to replace the supplier), and generally retain their
significance. Social networks increase loyalty only in Slovakia ($=.19, t=2.20), which is also the
only country where confidence in courts has a significant impact on loyalty.
39 Trade associations
have a more consistent effect on loyalty, though in Slovakia the effect is not significant.
                                                       
39 As with trade credit, experience using courts has a larger effect in Poland ($=-0.07, t=1.57) and also in Romania
($=-0.02, t=1.08).39
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All firmsPoland Slovakia Romania Russia Ukraine
Courts and other arbitrators:
% of firms saying courts can
     enforce contracts 68.4% 72.9% 67.9% 86.9% 55.8% 54.6%
% of firms reporting having had
     a dispute 57.7% 78.2% 83.4% 78.8% 17.2% 20.2%
% of those w/ dispute who used
     courts in last dispute 39.2% 46.1% 32.8% 30.4% 54.4% 66.7%
Member of trade association 47.8% 28.9% 31.5% 44.2% 74.4% 67.3%
Member of TA providing
     cust/sup information 39.3% 20.8% 23.4% 34.5% 60.0% 64.1%
Always or almost always resolve
     disputes w/o third party 61.1% 56.0% 52.7% 74.6% NA NA
Table 2
Indicators of Trading Relationships
All firmsPoland Slovakia Romania Russia Ukraine
Loyalty to existing suppliers
        Refuse offer of new supplier 16.9% 19.5% 24.0% 8.4% 16.3% 16.7%
        Buy from both 45.1% 38.0% 27.6% 29.1% 82.3% 75.4%
        Buy from new supplier 37.9% 42.5% 48.4% 62.5% 1.4% 7.9%
Produce goods only for this customer 20.9% 21.9% 33.1% 26.9% 4.4% 10.1%
Supplier produces only for man 10.5% 8.7% 15.9% 5.3% 11.5% 12.4%
"Would be impossible":
       To find alternative buyer 14.8% 20.0% 25.7% 10.1% 4.5% 9.4%
       For supplier to find alternative buyer 4.8% 7.5% 7.2% 1.7% 2.2% 4.3%
Average number of customers 69 100 86 107 10 12
% taking less than one week to:
       Find alternative buyer for goods 35.5% 39.4% 33.6% 50.0% 31.1% 16.2%
       Find alternative supplies 52.0% 60.7% 59.6% 76.7% 24.0% 14.0%43
Table 3
Summary of Hypotheses to be Tested
Trade Credit  Loyalty to
Offered Suppliers
Search Costs + +
Information:
  Duration of relationship + +
  Business networks + +
  Social networks + +
  Frequency of delivery + +
Institutions:
  Courts + -
  Trade associations + -
Table 4
Dependent Variables
All firmsPoland Slovakia Romania Russia Ukraine
Number of observations 1449 345 418 455 108 123
When bill is paid
                 % after delivery 59.2% 83.5% 69.7% 48.1% 11.8% 37.5%
                 % > 7 days after delivery 43.7% 71.0% 56.1% 28.1% 4.3% 17.0%
Number of firms within 1km 0.59 0.69 0.84 0.57 0.07 0.02
               (standard deviation) (1.83) (1.99) (2.15) (1.78) (0.38) (0.13)
% w/ no similar firms w/in 1km 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.76 0.96 0.98
Length of relation w/ customer (years) 2.49 2.34 2.13 1.89 4.43 4.63
              (standard deviation) (2.34) (2.43) (2.12) (1.98) (2.17) (2.14)
1st info from business association 44.7% 44.1% 48.3% 36.0% 41.2% 69.1%
Customer managed by family/friend 18.2% 6.4% 13.4% 30.5% 22.2% 18.7%
% of firms saying courts can
               enforce contracts 72.7% 73.0% 64.6% 89.0% 53.7% 56.1%
% of those w/ dispute who used
              courts in last dispute 27.5% 41.1% 28.7% 24.0% 9.3% 17.1%
Member of trade association providing
         customer/ supplier information 30.0% 17.7% 22.5% 35.4% 46.2% 56.1%44
Table 5
Trade Credit Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Probit for % paid after %  > 1 week % after delivery % paid after % paid after % paid after
Customer Search: credit/no credit delivery  after delivery * % of sales delivery delivery delivery
Number other firms  -0.02 -1.70 -1.30 -0.29 -2.09 -1.34 -1.39
  w/in 1 km (2.77) (3.07) (2.23) (1.59) (3.42) (2.31) (2.39)
Manufacturer Information:
Duration of relation 0.11 6.38 6.61 4.05 7.17 6.26 5.72
    (years) (6.09) (4.63) (4.51) (9.28) (4.45) (3.99) (3.64)
Duration squared -0.013 -0.73 -0.81 -0.45 -0.86 -0.69 -0.64
(4.89) (3.77) (3.86) (7.25) (3.62) (2.95) (2.70)
First information from  0.12 9.89 8.07 3.61 11.72 10.21 9.24
     business network (4.23) (4.37) (3.46) (5.12) (4.54) (4.05) (3.64)
First information from 0.14 9.42 9.95 3.53 10.85 10.77 8.86
    social network (4.07) (3.33) (3.31) (3.81) (3.40) (3.49) (2.83)
Frequency of 1.30
   delivery (0-5) (1.49)
Talk to other suppliers -2.17
 of this customer (0-4) (1.58)
Visits to or from customer 0.72
   before first sale (0-14) (2.33)
Courts:
Courts can enforce 0.08 5.86 7.82 2.41 5.37 4.10
   contracts (0-1) (2.74) (2.53) (3.20) (3.24) (1.95) (1.53)
Used court in most  3.10
   recent dispute (0-1) (1.26)
Member of trade association  0.06 3.66 1.73 0.84 2.71 3.11 3.32
  w/ cust, supplier services (2.18) (1.67) (0.75) (1.18) (1.07) (1.25) (1.33)
Other Variables:
Average % of bill paid to 0.22 0.21
  suppliers after delivery  (6.37) (6.30)
Industry/country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables No No No No No Yes Yes
Manager control variables No No No No No Yes Yes
Number of observations 1449 1449 1449 1449 1148 1148 1148
% obs not censored 21.95% 16.22% 68.60% 19.16% 19.16% 19.16%
Chi-Square 244.23 475.39 480.4 297.5 319 403.2 412.3
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Column 1 is a probit; columns 2-3 and 5-7 are two-tailed tobits; column 4 is a
      tailed tobit. The first column reports the change in the probability of giving credit; Columns 2-7 report the marginal
       effects in the uncensored range.
      All regressions include 9 industry and 4 country controls. The other control variables included in columns 6 
      and 7 are measures of the age of the firm and its square, the number of employees and its square, and 
      variables indicating firm received a bank loan in 1996, the customer is a retailer/wholesaler, the firm set prices
      by bargaining w/ customers, the customer is foreign-owned and the customer is local.  Manager controls are 
      age, years of schooling, was manager in an SOE, other family members own businesses, and family owned
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Time-varying Effect of Information on Trade Credit46
Table 6
Supplier Loyalty Independent Variables
All firms Poland Slovakia Romania Russia Ukraine
Number of observations 1051 311 379 315 30 16
Supplier produces this good
   only for your firm 11.3% 9.3% 17.2% 6.0% 16.7% 6.3%
Firm has no alternative
   supplier for this input 31.9% 26.4% 31.4% 37.8% 30.0% 37.5%
Length of time to replace 
   supplier (1-5) 2.24 (.93)2.15 (.98) 2.30 (1.00) 2.13 (.78)2.97 (.49)3.13 (.50)
Information:
Duration of relationship 
   (years) 2.21 (2.10) 2.44 (2.25) 2.24 (1.99) 1.59 (1.63) 4.49 (2.48) 4.89 (2.86)
Frequency of delivery
   (0-5) 2.83 (1.24) 2.80 (1.29) 2.84 (1.27) 2.93 (1.17) 2.27 (.87) 2.31 (1.20)
Supplier is managed by 
   family/friend 9.0% 3.2% 9.0% 14.3% 20.0% 0.0%
First information from
   other manufacturers 50.2% 50.8% 55.9% 41.0% 60.0% 68.8%
% of firms saying courts
   can enforce contracts 76.9% 77.8% 70.2% 88.3% 40.0% 62.5%
% of those w/ dispute who
    used courts in last dispute 27.9% 35.4% 27.4% 23.8% 6.7% 37.5%
Member of trade association providing 
  customer/supplier information 25.8% 19.0% 22.2% 34.9% 37.9% 33.3%
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.47
Table 7
Loyalty to Suppliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reject Deal Don't
Search: Accept Deal
Length of time to  0.18 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.07
  replace supplier (1-5) (4.09) (2.58) (2.34) (1.95) (3.19) (3.48)
Supplier produces good 0.53 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.17 0.17
 unique to your firm (4.46) (3.98) (3.94) (3.97) (4.54) (3.17)
Firm has no alternative 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.09 0.04
   supplier for this input (2.21) (2.34) (2.82) (2.95) (3.45) (0.91)
Information:
Duration of 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
   relationship (years) (2.02) (1.33) (1.36) (1.29) (2.03) (1.69)
First information from  -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01
     business network (0.08) (0.56) (0.37) (0.40) (0.86) (0.30)
First information from 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.08 0.09
    social network (1.85) (1.61) (1.79) (1.62) (1.86) (1.57)
Frequency of delivery 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.03
  (0-6) (2.91) (3.30) (3.56) (3.54) (2.39) (2.38)
Visits  to or from supplier 0.03 0.03 0.03
 before 1st transaction (0-14) (2.50) (2.40) (2.58)
Other suppliers would learn 0.15 0.16 0.15
 of dispute w/ this supplier (1.66) (1.69) (1.64)
Courts:
Courts can enforce  -0.13 -0.17 -0.17 -0.06 -0.02
   contracts (1.51) (1.82) (1.82) (2.22) (0.60)
Used court in most -0.38
 recent dispute (4.20)
Trade associations provide -0.27 -0.28 -0.31 -0.30 -0.09 -0.09
   customer/supplier services (3.17) (3.12) (3.38) (3.31) (3.88) (2.29)
Loan in 1996 0.16 0.15 0.18
(1.90) (1.81) (2.16)
Industry/country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables No Yes Yes Yes No No
Manager control variables No No Yes Yes No No
Number of observations 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051
Chi-Square 145.6 215.4 231.5 246.1 131.5 144.9
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Notes: t-values in parentheses. The coefficients in columns 5 and 6 are dp/dx slope coefficeints.
     All regressions also include 4 country and 9 industry indicators.The regressions in columns
     2-4 include the age of the firm and its square, the number of employees and its square, and 
     a variable indicating that the firm sets prices through bargaing with customers, a variable
     indicating that the supplier is a wholesaler or retailer, and indicators of foreign ownership and 
     location in a different city. Manager controls are age, years of schooling, was manager in an SOE,
     other family members own businesses, and family owned business before 1950.48
Appendix: Table A-1 
Sample Comparisons
Poland Slovakia Romania Russia Ukraine
Number of firms surveyed: 303 321 308 269 270
Year Founded:
before 1988 68 13 0 4 17
1988-1989 38 7 3 13 21
1990-1993 138 199 204 182 152
1994-1997 59 89 114 64 74
Percent privatized 21.8% 22.7% 12.5% 51.8% 69.1%
Manager worked previously:
     Private sector 35.2% 28.3% 8.4% 20.5% 11.9%
     Public Sector 93.7% 87.3% 88.5% 98.8% 95.6%
Public--manger 35.1% 25.8% 29.6% 57.8% 62.2%
Public--engineer 34.0% 38.9% 51.7% 38.2% 35.6%
Public--ord worker 37.6% 34.5% 17.7% 5.1% 2.2%
Years schooling of manager 15.7 16.2 16.1 15.3 15.2
# employees in 1st year 44 42 54 34 60
# employees end of 1996 63 57 57 35 60
Employ 1st year--privatized83 119 257 47 73
Employ 1st year--startup 33 19 25 22 32
Percent of firms in sector:
 Metal parts and products 27.7% 26.0% 27.7% 12.7% 18.6%
 Wood products/furniture 5.9% 9.4% 11.5% 2.6% 5.2%
 Food products 11.9% 10.7% 19.6% 10.1% 6.3%
 Footwear/clothing 16.5% 12.7% 14.6% 14.9% 4.5%
 Construction materials 9.2% 10.4% 11.5% 14.9% 15.6%
 Chemical products 9.9% 8.1% 7.8% 6.3% 9.7%
 Paper and packaging 1.6% 4.2% 2.5% 7.1% 1.9%
 Handicrafts and art 1.3% 0.7% 1.6% 1.1% 1.9%
 Electrical machinery 8.3% 8.4% 0.6% 12.3% 11.1%
 Miscellaneous 7.6% 9.4% 2.5% 17.9% 25.3%49
Table B-1
Trade Credit Regression Results by Country
(1) (2) (3) (3)
Poland Slovakia Romania Russia/Ukr
Customer Search:
Number other firms  -1.08 -2.59 -0.06
  w/in 1 km (1.28) (2.63) (0.05)
Manufacturer Information:
Duration of relationship 5.74 4.77 9.70 -0.57
    (years) (2.82) (1.47) (3.10) (0.16)
Duration squared -0.72 -0.51 -1.15 -0.01
(2.17) (1.00) (2.18) (0.01)
First information from  12.36 9.54 11.59 11.38
     business network (2.85) (2.17) (2.49) (2.15)
First information from -2.29 7.60 14.44 13.04
    social network (0.34) (1.23) (2.96) (1.98)
Courts:
Courts can enforce -0.44 10.27 5.62 4.21
   contracts (0-1) (0.11) (2.42) (0.90) (0.99)
Member of trade association  -2.51 3.92 6.88 10.99
  w/ cust, supplier services (0.57) (0.77) (1.70) (2.57)
Country/industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables No No No No
Manager control variables No No No No
Number of observations 345 418 455 231
% obs not censored 7.54% 13.64% 29.45% 43.72%
Chi-Square 35.9 48 51.5 21.07
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Notes: t-values in parentheses. All regressions include 9 industry and 4 country controls.
            In Russia and Ukraine, the number respondents reporting other similar manufacturers  
            located within 1 km is not sufficient to include this variable.50
Table B-2




Length of time to  0.07 0.04 -0.1*E-5
  replace supplier (1-5) (2.93) (1.56) (0.00)
Supplier produces good 0.17 0.21 0.15
 unique to your firm (2.01) (3.40) (2.60)
Firm has no alternative 0.14 0.05 0.05
   supplier for this input (2.68) (1.04) (2.26)
Information:
Duration of 0.01 0.02 0.0003
   relationship (years) (1.08) (1.73) (0.06)
First information from  0.004 -0.02 -0.02
     business network (0.10) (0.51) (1.21)
First information from -0.02 0.19 -0.004
    social network (0.17) (2.20) (0.19)
Frequency of delivery 0.03 0.04 -0.002
  (0-6) (1.86) (2.19) (0.29)
Courts:
Courts can enforce  0.01 -0.13 -0.01
   contracts (0.10) (2.68) (0.41)
Trade associations provide -0.15 -0.07 -0.05
   customer/supplier services (2.84) (1.35) (2.89)
Industry/country controls Yes Yes Yes
Other control variables No No No
Manager control variables No No No
Number of observations 311 379 315
Chi-Square 49.22 57.1 31.1
p-value <0.001 <0.001 0.0132
Notes: t-values in parentheses. The coefficients are dp/dx slope coefficeints.
             All regressions include 9 industry and 4 country controls.
             In Russia and Ukraine, there is not enough variance in the dependent
             variable to give meaningful results. All but five firms with private suppliers
              say they would buy from both the old and new supplier.51
 Table B-3
Trade Credit and Supplier Loyalty Regressions for Oldest and Newest Trading Partners
Oldest  Newest Oldest  Newest
Customer Customer Supplier Supplier
Customer Search: Search:
Number other firms  -0.93 2.29 Length of time to  0.18 0.70
  w/in 1 km (1.21) (2.90)   replace supplier (1-5) (2.71) (2.87)
Supplier produces good 0.38 0.65
Manufacturer Info:  unique to your firm (2.18) (3.88)
Duration of relation 5.84 4.75 Firm has no alternative 0.25 0.17
(2.25) (1.33)    supplier for this input (1.86) (1.44)
Duration squared -0.72 -0.20
(2.50) (0.43) Information:
First information from  6.40 12.76 Duration of 0.02 -0.03
   other manufacts (0-1) (2.08) (3.95)    relationship (years) (0.67) (0.59)
Managed by family 6.18 12.43 First information from  -0.2 0.11
   or friend (0-1) (1.71) (2.90)      business network (1.62) (1.09)
First information from 0.06 0.40
Courts:     social network (0.27) (2.33)
Courts can enforce 5.36 6.13 Frequency of delivery 0.02 0.13
   contracts (0-1) (1.77) (1.82)   (0-6) (0.50) (3.04)
Member of trade association  5.16 3.11
  w/ cust, supplier services (1.76) (0.99) Courts:
Courts can enforce  -0.17 -0.10
   contracts (1.22) (0.89)
Trade associations provide -0.29 -0.24
   customer/supplier services (2.12) (2.12)
Industry/country controls Yes Yes Industry/country controls Yes Yes
Other control variables No No Other control variables Yes Yes
Manager control variables No No Manager control variables No No
Number of observations 708 741 Number of observations 430 621
% obs not censored 25.85% 18.22% Chi-Square 56.2 93.7
Chi-square 285.6 214.2 p-value 0.0621 0.0789
p-value <.001 <.001
Notes: t-values in parentheses. All regressions include 9 industry and 4 country controls.